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Abstract 
The introduction of decoupled direct payments in the EU was a substantial change of 
the  Common  Agricultural  Policy  (CAP)  in  2003.  After  decoupling  direct  payments  from 
production, it has become evident, that distributional objectives are the major justification of 
farm payments. There are three facets: the distribution of payments among farmers within 
member states, the distribution of payments among member states, and the distribution of 
household incomes within member states. All of them will be affected if the volume and 
allocation of funds for the CAP will be changed in the new financial framework of the EU. 
The  paper  addresses  the  first  distributional  aspects.  We  provide  an  overview  of  the 
development of past and present research and findings on the distributional aspects of direct 
payments. We use the theory of federal fiscal relations to identify the policy agendas that 
should be handled at the EU level, at national levels, and at sub-national levels. We analyse 
how measures of concentration are affected if the criteria of direct payments are changed (e.g. 
a  modified  modulation  scheme).  This  allows  us  to  identify  potential  consequences  after 
changing the way direct payments are distributed within EU member states. The summary of 
the  paper  discusses  the  distributional  consequences  of  scenarios  of  the  coming  financial 
framework as far as agriculture is concerned. 
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Centralisation versus decentralisation 
Federalism and subsidiarity – from a normative economic perspective 
The theory of fiscal federalism is a normative concept that defines which government 
responsibilities should be transferred to the Union and which ones should remain with the 
member states (see, e.g., Tabellini, 2003, Breuss and Eller, 2004, Caesar, 2004, Heinemann, 
2005). It is based on pioneer work by Musgrave (1959) und Oates (1972). The "optimal" 
political decision level for each single policy area is identified on the basis of cost-benefit 
considerations.  Centralisation  and  decentralisation  each  have  specific  advantages  and 
drawbacks  that  may  differ  from  one  government  function  to  another.  Wheigting  relative 
benefits  and  costs  of  (de)centralisation  of  responsibilities  will  give  guidance  on  the 
appropriate  allocation  of  responsibilities  to  the  different  territorial  authorities.  Fiscal 
federalism tries to identify an efficient multi-level governance structure for the public sector. 
Public services are viewed from the perspective of a benefit region. Public goods can 
be grouped whether tey are locally, regionally, nationally or supra-nationally relevant. The 
"principle of fiscal equivalence" (Olson, 1969) states that the responsibility for the provision 
of a public good should be conveyed to that territorial authority where the community of 
beneficiaries corresponds to that of taxpayers. If the benefits of public goods provided by one 
region spills over to the inhabitants of neighbouring regions, the overall supply of public 
goods will be sub-optimal. 
External effects can be internalised and a welfare-optimal supply of public goods will 
be generated by centralising the responsibility. However, centralisation does not necessarily 
mean that the entire responsibility rests with the higher-ranking government level: The central 
level can provide incentives to the sub-central authorities to take into account the spill-overs 
of their policy decisions via financial transfers (Oates, 1972). A co-financing of public tasks 
and the sharing of responsibilities between different government levels in a federal state may 
be interpreted as intermediate steps on the way towards full centralisation. The centralisation 
may be meaningful for public goods and services offering substantial economies of scale in 
consumption. 
Advantages of a centralised supply of public goods have to be weighed against their 
disadvantages. Decentralised responsibilities for economic policy can better adapt decisions 
to inter-regional differences of individual preferences. When preferences of the population 
concerning  the  quantity  and  quality  of  public  goods  differ  across  countries,  a  closer  tie 
between policy making and citizens favours decentralised responsibilities. Lower information 
and dissatisfaction costs have to be considered as well (Oates, 1972). A general perception is 
that the centralisation of responsibilities tends to work in favour of uniform policies. With a 
view to the "optimal" allocation of responsibilities, there is thus a conflict between the supply 
of public goods according to popular preferences on the one hand, and the internalisation of 
regional external effects and the exploitation of economies of scale, on the other (Alesina   
Angeloni   Etro, 2005).   4
Consequences for the division of responsibilities 
EU responsibilities would be policy areas where benefits of policy action extend EU-
wide and/or where economies of scale in consumption are large enough so that they can be 
realised only at the EU level. In other cases, the individual member states (or regional or local 
territorial authorities) should provide the public good in question. In situations with spill-
overs and economies of scale below the EU level, the countries concerned should co-operate, 
in order to establish a link between beneficiaries, decision makers and the tax payers for a 
particular public good. 
In some cases competition between countries for internationally mobile companies and 
taxpayers  can  have  welfare-enhancing  effects.  According  to  supporters  of  a  competitive 
solution, firms can reveal their preferences for different sets of taxes and public services by 
choosing where to reside or produce if decentralised political responsibilities are possible 
(Tiebout, 1956). Competition between the territorial authorities is expected to promote the 
elaboration  of  innovative  policy  approaches  ("laboratory  federalism",  Oates,  1999),  and 
member states' governments would have stronger incentives to align their policy proposals to 
people's preferences. 
An  alternative  view  stresses  that  the competition  for  mobile  factors  of  production 
could induce a circle of deregulation in major policy areas. The risk of a "race to the bottom" 
is seen in particular for capital taxation, threatening the financing of public goods and services 
(e. g., Wildasin   Wilson, 2004). According to this view, such competition holds the risk of an 
erosion of the welfare state and of desirable regulations at the national level, such as for 
working conditions, environmental protection or the framework for competition (Sinn, 1997). 
 
Spending responsibilities for the EU 
Regulative policy areas for the functioning of the Internal Market 
Several authors (e. g., Breuss and Eller, 2004, Caesar, 2004, Alesina, Angeloni and 
Schuknecht,  2005,  Feld,  2005)  have  made  suggestions  on  a  favorable  distribution  of 
responsibilities in the EU. The consensus is that policy areas with significant economies of 
scale or spill-overs of benefits at the European level and homogeneous preferences should be 
the core competencies of the Community. EU competencies are widely recognised in the 
areas of:  
•  protection of basic freedoms, 
•  preservation  of  a  competitive  framework,  including  control  of  member  states' 
subsidies policy, 
•  common foreign policy. 
A sharing of responsibilities between the Community and the member states appears 
to make sense. As far as competition policy is concerned, this proposition is not without 
problems since views about the role of competition and the competitive framework differ to a   5
considerable extent. Hence, homogeneous preferences can be assumed only subject to strong 
qualifications.  Besides,  not  all  problems  of  competition  policy  touch  upon  the  smooth 
functioning of the Internal Market. In general, these policy areas mainly require intervention 
of a regulative and co-ordinating kind to secure the functioning of the Single Market, with 
only minor budgetary implications. 
 
Policy areas with significant differences in preferences between countries 
In a number of policy areas, an independent EU responsibility is contested, due to 
significant differences in preferences between countries which may limit or even outweigh the 
possible benefits from exploiting increasing returns to scale and an internalisation of regional 
external effects. Differences in preferences arise mainly from the welfare differential between 
the  national  economies  and  from  differing  norms  and  value  systems.  In  particular,  this 
concerns the policy areas of: 
•  foreign and security policy, 
•  enlargement and development aid policy, 
•  international and global (as opposed to regional and local) environmental policy, 
•  trans-European networks for energy and transport, 
•  research policy, 
•  education policy. 
In principle, foreign and domestic security are (nearly) pure public goods with sizeable 
returns to scale in consumption (Samuelson, 1954). In view of the clear nature of foreign and 
security  policy  as  a  collective  good,  at  least  a  co-ordinating  role  of  the  EU  would  seem 
appropriate (Tabellini, 2003). With the same argument, tasks of co-ordination can be justified 
for cross-border issues of internal security such as the fight against terrorism. Furthermore, 
EU responsibilities are judged in the areas of enlargement and development aid policy, based 
on the consideration that all member states would benefit from progress in these areas, e.g., 
from a reduction of poverty-driven migration flows or the opening of new markets. Adding 
also expenditure on humanitarian aid and emergency help, the foreign- and security-related 
policy areas account for some € 6.7 billion or 5.3 percent of the overall budget. 
In 2007, the EU provided € 1.2 billion in funds for education and cultural policy. At 
present,  education  policy  calls  mainly  for  regulatory  EU  competencies  in  the  interest  of 
greater mobility of students and labour via mutual recognition of educational qualifications. 
Should the removal of barriers in this regard lead to a high degree of international labour 
mobility, more important responsibilities with financial implications would accrue to the EU 
if  countries  would  become  freeriders  of  educational  efforts  undertaken  by  other  member 
states. Nevertheless, the arguments for conferring such financial responsibilities to the EU as 
from  now  are  not  very  strong,  given  that  (part  of)  the  existing  differences  in  national 
education  systems  are  probably  the  reflection  of  heterogeneous  preferences.  Moreover,   6
different approaches to educational policy give rise to a desirable competition for the best 
outcomes. In the area of cultural policy, any EU-wide returns to scale or benefit spill-overs 
are difficult to identify. 
Generally, the view is held that industrial policy should rather not be counted among 
the tasks of the EU, since EU-wide spill-over effects can hardly be identified and industrial 
policy  preferences  differ  significantly  across  member  states  (Alesina,  Angeloni,  and 
Schuknecht,  2005).  Pelkmans  (2001)  invokes  in  support  of  EU  competencies  that 
competition-distorting national subsidies would be replaced by measures of support from the 
supra-national level. However, this argument becomes less relevant if the control of subsidies 
is effective. Part of the EU expenditure for industrial policy is recorded under the budget 
heading of "enterprises", with a total of € 524 million. But industrial policy subsidies are also 
included under the items of "research", "media" and "energy and transport". Overall, however, 
planned EU expenditure is relatively small, also because the tasks of the Community are 
meant to be only complementary to the measures taken by the member states.  
The  budget  heading  of  "employment  and  social  policy"  provides  for  funds  to  the 
amount of € 11.4 billion in 2007, equivalent to 9 percent of budgetary commitments. Yet, 
from the fiscal federalism perspective it is not clear why the EU should be active in these 
areas with a sizeable amount of financial resources. Thus, it would be difficult to argue that 
problems of structural adjustment on national labour markets ought to be cushioned by EU-
wide employment policy interventions. It is up to the member states in the first place to 
address  the  largely  home-made  problems  by  labour  market  measures  that  can  be  better 
designed  according  to  the  particular  national  circumstances  (Berthold  and  Fehn,  2002). 
Strongly heterogeneous preferences also imply that the Union should hardly become active in 
the area of social policy. First, there are large differences between individual member states' 
level of welfare, with the consequence of diverging perceptions about the appropriate policy 
in favour of social equality; second, attitudes towards a policy of redistribution are shaped by 
socio-cultural factors and differ markedly between the member states. 
Nevertheless, social policy programmes may be reasonable if labour mobility across 
countries  is  high  (e.  g.,  Wildasin,  1998).  In  that  case,  the  theory  of  fiscal  federalism 
recommends redistributive policy to be centralised (Oates, 1972). Thus, a responsibility for 
setting minimum standards could be attributed to the EU, in order to prevent a "race to the 
bottom" or "social dumping". Admittedly, however, there is no convincing empirical evidence 
in the literature for a race to the bottom actually taking place between welfare states (e. g., 
Hines, 2006). One should also bear in mind that setting high minimum standards would take 
away a competitive advantage from the less affluent member states. 
 
The special case of agricultural policy 
The expenditure block still dominating the EU budget is the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP). Overall, almost € 57 billion were planned in 2007 for agriculture (including   7
fishery). In this regard, a distinction has to be made between market intervention and direct 
subsidies on the one hand, claiming a total of around € 44.5 billion (together with fishery 
policy),  and  policies  for  rural  development  on  the  other  (some  €  12.4  billion).  Many 
economists hold the view that the arguments in favour of a policy of agricultural subsidies at 
the European level are not very convincing (e. g., Hoeller, Louppe, and Vergriete, 1996, Feld, 
2005). However, in this regard a more nuanced look at the problem is deemed appropriate. 
It is not certain that EU-wide agricultural market stability can be can be attained if 
internal  prices  levels  are  close  to  world  prices.  Given  the  income  levels  in  the  EU  the 
possibility to buy agricultural products on world markets, the case for security of supply is 
rather weak. Therefore, the transition from market intervention to direct subsidies is to be 
welcomed from the economics perspective. However, the "first pillar" of the CAP (market-
related  expenditure  and  direct  payments)  is  to  serve  primarily  objectives  related  to  the 
personal income distribution for which an EU responsibility can be challenged under current 
circumstances.  Moreover,  the  conflict  regularly  arising  in  budget  negotiations  between 
member states with a relatively important agricultural sector vs. states with a less important 
agricultural sector indicates that national preferences cannot be assumed to be homogeneous 
across the EU. Neither can EU-wide spill-over effects or returns to scale of any significant 
degree be identified. Thus, from a fiscal federalism perspective, a good deal could be said in 
favour  of  a  re-nationalisation  of  the  "first  pillar"  of  the  CAP.  In  that  case,  however, 
agricultural subsidies would have to be subjected to strict control in order to prevent member 
states from outbidding each other with higher subsidies (Schweickert, 2005). 
More  favourable  is  the  judgement  for  the  programmes  in  support  of  rural 
development. Although economic arguments will hardly be found for permanent subsidies to 
a shrinking agricultural sector, temporary measures to facilitate structural adjustment may be 
envisaged in the context of a regional development strategy (Sapir et al., 2003), although such 
measures, like those of social and employment policy, are rather considered appropriate at the 
national  level.  Nevertheless,  a  readjustment  towards  an  ecologically-minded  agricultural 
policy may justify an establishment of EU responsibilities. While the direct benefits of an 
environmentally responsible agricultural policy are predominantly local, such policy may still 
create positive effects at the international level which may not be fully recognised in national 
decisions.  EU  subsidies  may  also  be  justified  if  there  were  evidence  for  member  states 
engaging in a "race to the bottom" with regard to national environmental standards. Overall, a 
case could be made for creating an EU responsibility for selected policy areas of the "second 
pillar" of the CAP. 
 
Direct Payments of the Common Agricultural Policy 
During  the  last  15  years  direct  payments  have  become  the  most  impor-tant  fiscal 
policy tool in the EU. In 2006, direct payments amounted to EUR 33.1 billion, which was 
equivalent  to  31  per  cent  of  the  EU’s  total  operating  expenditure  (EUR  106.58  billion).   8
Decoupled direct pay-ments (DPPs) subdivide into Single Farm Payments (SFPs, EUR 14.2 
billion), and Single Area Payments (SAPs, EUR 1.7 billion). Output linked direct payments 
are granted for plants (EUR 12 billion) and live-stock products (EUR 5.7 billion). According 
to the Economic Accounts of Agriculture, the share of direct payments in the factor income of 
ag-riculture amounts to 26.5 percent in 2006. 
Within DPs the share of decoupled payments has increased recently, because the milk 
quota  premiums  had  been  fully  decoupled  by  2007,  and  due  to  the  phasing  in  of  area 
payments for member states that en-tered the EU in 2004. The share of DDPs will likely 
further increase be-cause the Commission pledged to further reduce trade distorting inter-nal 
support measures (see EU offer at the G4-summit in Potsdam 2007). 
 
Selected studies on distributional aspects in agriculture 
Usually,  the  political  rationale  of  distributive  policies  is  to  improve  the  income 
distribution by transferring money from richer to poorer households in order to correct market 
outcomes according to politically determined equity objectives. For a long time, agricultural 
economists  (e.g.  Koester  and  Tangermann,  1976)  have  advocated  the  introduction  of 
decoupled direct payments as an important step to mitigate the negative effects of market 
price support, including the mitigation of the regressive distribution effects of output linked 
support. 
According to Article 33 of the Treaty, one goal of the CAP is "to ensure a fair standard 
of living for the agricultural community, in particular by increasing the individual earnings of 
persons  engaged  in  agricul-ture"  while  simultaneously  guaranteeing  adequate  consumer 
prices. This vaguely seems to point in the direction of a fair distribution of support across 
farming units.  
Over the last years, OECD has repeatedly looked at the various dimen-sions of the 
distribution  of  agricultural  incomes.  OECD  (1999)  analyses  the  distributional  effects  of 
agricultural policies in the mid-90s by com-paring the distribution of support in relation to 
output and income in OECD countries. The report concludes that the distribution of market 
price support is very similar to the one of output and that differences across regions are less 
than those across farm types or size classes. Moreover, the distributional patterns have shown 
little change over the last ten years. Kurashige and Hwan Cho (2001) examine the incidence 
of  low  income  as  well  as  the  impact  of  social  security  policies  of  OECD  countries  in 
agriculture. Based on various indicators they find out that "low income" is higher among farm 
households than among non-farm households and despite generous support in many OECD 
countries the income distribution of farm households shows a higher degree of ine-quality 
than of non-farm households.  
Allanson (2007 and 2008) analyses the redistributive effect of “horizontal inequity”, 
being the differences between the level of support received by farms of a given type and the 
level of pre-support income: again, the provision of support increased the average size of farm   9
income differ-entails throughout the period 2000/01 to 2004/05. Similarly, in a recent study 
on Tuscany (IT), Allanson and Rocchi (2007) find that the provision of support increased 
absolute income inequality within the agri-cultural community because the distribution of 
transfers was both vertically and horizontally inequitable.  
There  are  only  a  small  number  of  studies  which  lead  to  other  conclusions.  One 
example is Keeney (2000), a study of Irish agriculture based on individual farm records. 
Keeney demonstrates that the direct pay-ment of the MacSharry reform induced a more equal 
distribution of family farm incomes in Ireland.  
The territorial dimension of CAP expenditures has been analyzed by Shucksmith et al. 
(2005).  Looking  at  the  regional  distribution  of  CAP  payments  and  their  contribution  to 
cohesion objectives, the authors found that CAP payments do not support territorial cohesion, 
because more prosperous regions get higher levels of CAP transfers. This holds not only for 
market based support, but also – although somewhat less pronounced – for support through 
rural  development  programs.  At  a  similar  result  with  respect  to  the  distribution  of  farm 
support between continental and Mediterranean agriculture arrive Mora and San Juan (2004).  
With hardly any exceptions, studies looking at distributional effects of the CAP reveal 
that the current instruments of the CAP do not prevent a substantial part of farmers from 
being among the poorest citizens of EU member states. At the same time, direct payments to 
high-income  farm  units  and  regions  contribute  to  pronounced  income  inequalities  in  this 
sector. This survey also shows that a cross country comparison of direct payments before and 
after the 2003 CAP reform has not yet been made. 
 
Data Sources and Methods 
Established information systems measuring the effects of CAP on farm incomes are 
hardly adequate for analyzing distributional outcomes (Court of Auditors, 2004):  
•  The income indicator of the farm accountancy data network (FADN) – 'farm family 
income' – is tricky to interpret, because many agricul-tural holdings are organized as 
companies. In addition, the sample of farms providing the information is considered to 
be not representa-tive.  
•  The economic accounts for agriculture (EAA) is a satellite account of the national 
accounts.  Its  main  indicators  are  'factor  income'  and  'net  entrepreneurial  income'. 
Besides the fact that the quality of data sup-plied by some Member States seems to be 
poor, these indicators are only provided at sector level. Distributional comparisons can 
there-fore only be made across countries or with other sectors, but not among farm 
holdings within the farming sector of a country.  
•  The same is true for statistics on the income of the agricultural households sectors 
(IAHS; see Eurostat,  2002). The methodologies of  the  underlying concept are not 
harmonized  which  'cast[s]  doubt  on  the  possibility  of comparing  data  supplied  by   10
member states' (Court of Audi-tors, 2004). In general, IAHS allows comparing non-
farm household incomes with farm-household incomes, yet not in all member states.  
Aggregated data on the distribution of direct payments across EU Member States have 
been published regularly since they were intro-duced and can therefore be set in relation to 
other variables of interest like the number of farms or persons engaged in farming. The most 
up-to-date figures on the distribution of direct payments across farm hold-ings were published 
by Eurostat in 2008. In 2006, EU expenditures for the Common Agricultural Policy amounted 
to EUR 49.9 billion (47 per cent of the total budget). Direct payments (EUR 34 billion) had 
the largest share, followed by market related expenditures (EUR 8 billion) and payments for 
the  rural  development  program  (EUR  7.7  billion).  Both,  the  volume  and  share  of  direct 
payments have increased since the CAP reform in 1992. In the year 2000 direct payments 
amounted to EUR 24.1 billion and EUR 32.5 billion in 2005. Given that farm pay-ments have 
been increasing and that structural change has taken place at an average annual rate close to 2 
per cent, payments per annual working unit (AWU) have been increasing until the entry of ten 
new Member States in 2004. 
In  the  year  2000,  the  average  payments  per  recipient  were  below  EUR  2,000  in 
Portugal and Italy and were highest in Denmark (EUR 10,585) and the UK (EUR 19,272). 
The EU-15 average was EUR 6,331 (ranging from 1,747 in Greece and 21,429 in the United 
Kingdom) five years later. Direct payments per holding were considerably lower in the new 
Member States that entered the EU in 2004 (on average EUR 723 – from 232 in Cyprus to 
11,397 in Czech Republic). Therefore the mean of di-rect payments per holding in the EU 
dropped from EUR 5,017 per holding to EUR 4,682 between 2000 and 2006. 
In preparing the 2003 CAP reform, EU Commissioner Franz Fischler released for the 
first time fairly detailed data about the distribution of direct payments to foster a political 
climate to curb the size of high-end CAP payments. EUROSTAT publishes the number of 
recipients and the volume of transfers aggregated in 12 classes. Comparing the hold-ings 
getting less than 5,000 Euros with those getting more can be used to show that a small number 
of recipients got a relatively large share of all direct payments in 2000: 953,000 holdings 
received more than EUR 5,000, totalling EUR 15.5 billion. 21 per cent of holdings getting 
such support received 82 per cent of all direct payments. Until 2006 the dis-tribution has 
become more unequal: 1.3 million farms (18 per cent of the 7.3 million recipients) got EUR 
27.9 billion (84 per cent of direct payments).  
 
Evidence on the distribution of direct payments 
The distribution of direct payments is quite different in the EU member states. Figure 
1  shows  a  comparison  of  selected  countries  of  EU15  in  2002  as  well  as  the  change  in 
distribution for EU15 between 2002 and 2006. 
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Figure 1 - Distribution of direct payments in EU-15 and selected member states 2002 and 2006 
   
Source: Commission of the EU, own calculations. 
Note: Figures are truncated at 500.000 Euro, the presented volume of payments is for the open class 500.000 € 
and above. The graph is based on classified data with varying class sizes, therefore the real, but unknown 
distribution may look slightly different. 
 
A more sophisticated measure of (in)equality is the concentration ratio (CR). It has the 
same interpretation as the Gini-Coefficient, but it is calculated in a slightly different way. 
High levels of CR (close to 100) indicate that a small number of recipients get a large amount 
of payments while a low CR indicates a more equal distribution. An in depth study on the 
development of concentration ratios of direct payments in the EU along with a technical 
treatment of various distribution measures is provided in Sinabell, Schmid and Hofreither 
(2008).We use the methodology provided in this study to analyse the consequences of policy 
changes on the concentration of direct payments if a scenario similar to the one proposed by 
the Commission of the EU in the "health check reform" is applied. 
We assume that  this proposal will not  be endorsed by  the Council  of Minisers in 
November 2008, but the proposal to reduce transfers for those holdings that get more than 
5,000 € will be on the roadmap of future reforms of the CAP. Another proposal we look at is 
the abandonment of payments below 500 €. Low payments entail relatively high transaction 
costs and therefore it would make economic sense to define a minimum payment, as the 
Commission has suggested (250€). Almost 50% of the recipients (3.4 Mio of 7.3) obtained 
less than 500 € of direct payments in 2006. Compensating them with a one time payment 
would allow significant future savings of administrative costs.  
In Table 1 the results of various scenarios of alternative implementation schemes of 
the direct payments are provided. The scenarios are applied to statistics available for 2006. 
This implies that changes in the distribution of are not accounted for. However, given that the   12
distribution of land is rather similar to the distribution of direct payments, one would not 
expect  that  any  change  from  the  historic  model  the  regional  model  would  have  major 
implications on the distribution of direct payments. 
The results in Table 1 show that the distribution of direct payments (both decoupled 
ones  and  non-decoupled  ones)  is  very  heterogeneous  among  Member  States.  In  several 
countries like Malta, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Italy, Hungary and Portugal it is a 
small number of recipients that get a relatively large share of direct payments. In countries 
like Luxembourg or Slovenia, the payments are relatively equally distributed. 
 
Table 1 - Concentration ratios of all direct payments for alternative scenarios 
  observed direct  Scenarios 
  payments in 2006  >500 €/farm  modulation 13%  Progressive 
modulation 
Combination of all 
BE  57.0  57.2  55.8  55.7  56.0 
CZ  85.6  85.9  85.0  84.7  85.0 
DK  69.3  69.6  68.4  68.3  68.6 
DE  70.7  71.0  69.7  69.1  69.4 
EE  83.7  89.2  82.8  82.8  88.6 
GR  66.7  71.0  66.0  66.0  70.5 
ES  75.6  76.7  74.5  74.4  75.7 
FR  57.3  57.4  56.5  56.4  56.5 
IE  55.1  55.3  53.8  53.8  53.9 
IT  81.5  84.8  80.6  80.5  84.1 
CY  71.0  91.8  70.9  70.9  91.8 
LV  71.3  91.7  70.8  70.8  91.5 
LT  71.0  92.3  70.4  70.4  92.1 
LU  46.3  46.4  45.5  45.5  45.6 
HU  84.5  88.9  83.5  83.3  88.0 
MT  94.1  97.0  94.0  94.0  97.0 
NL  71.2  71.9  70.3  70.3  71.0 
AT  56.7  57.4  55.4  55.4  56.2 
PL  58.0  82.4  57.6  57.6  82.3 
PT  85.5  88.8  84.5  84.4  88.1 
SI  54.7  77.1  54.7  54.7  77.1 
SK  90.9  91.5  90.6  90.5  91.1 
FI  50.0  50.2  48.6  48.6  48.8 
SE  68.4  68.9  67.3  67.2  67.8 
UK  71.6  71.8  71.0  70.6  70.9 
EU10  77.6  90.4  76.2  76.0  89.7 
EU15  78.5  79.5  77.6  77.5  78.5 
EU25  82.5  83.9  81.7  81.6  83.1 
Note:  The  figures  are  related  to  the  total  of  direct  payments (including  both  decoupled  and  not decoupled 
payments). In the 'scenario >500 €/farm' direct payments below 500 € per holding will be no longer paid; in the 
"scenario modulation 13%" amounts above 5,000 € are reduced by 13%; in the 'scenario progressive modulation' 
payments between 5,000 € and 99,999 € per holding are reduced by 13%, payments between 100,000 € and 
199.999 € are reduced by 16%, payments between 200,000 € and 299,999 are reduced by 19%, higher payments 
are reduced by 22%.   13
If only payments above 500 € would have been paid in 2006, this would have had 
significant effects on the distribution of direct payments, in particular in the Member States 
that entered the EU in 2004: the concentration ratio would significantly increase to a level of 
90 from a level that is close to that of EU-15 Member States. While such a scenario has 
significant  consequences,  the  distributive  effects  of  a  more  intense  modulation  or  a 
progressive modulation are relatively minor at the aggregate level. But in some countries 
(Belgium, Austria, Sweden) the effects would be significant. 
 
Conclusions and discussion 
The  economic  theory  of  federalism  is  based  upon  the  assumption  that  national 
governments consider themselves exclusively committed to the goal of maximising national 
welfare.  An  alternative  view  is  held  by  political  economy  approaches  which  explicitly 
integrate the self-interests of the political actors. In that sense, the EU budget is interpreted as 
the result of compromises negotiated among national governments that act in their interest of 
being  re-elected  and  therefore  have  to  mind  the  specific  concerns  of  influential  interest 
groups. Such powerful lobbies may block progress towards closer integration, if they fear 
disadvantages from further market liberalisation in Europe or are uncertain about their market 
prospects. 
The inclusion of income-maintenance elements into the EU budget, which is criticised 
from a fiscal federalism perspective, may serve the purpose of compensating potential losers 
of increasing market integration in the member states (Bhagwati - Srinivasan, 1969). Thus, a 
transfer of agricultural policy to the European level in the early 1960s is seen in political 
economy terms as a concession to the powerful French farmers' lobby in order to weaken 
resistance against market opening. High flows from the EU budget to agricultural producers 
whose interests are by tradition strongly represented at the national level, are thus intended to 
compensate for (actual or believed) disadvantages of the integration process. 
Against this background, the centralisation of agricultural policy at the European level 
may be criticised from a narrow economics perspective, but may also be taken as a political 
precondition (a "price") for progress in integration. In a similar way, the establishment of the 
structural and cohesion funds is interpreted as a compensation deal. This also explains why 
countries like Austria or Germany, which on balance can expect additional benefits from 
further market liberalisation, are ready in principle to accept being a net contributor to the 
system. 
A possible consequence of the establishment of a European responsibility is that in 
more recent times agricultural policy has come under somewhat lower pressure from national 
interests in maintaining the status quo. Since the mid-1990s, the EU is steering the CAP 
towards reform with the aim of price liberalisation while strengthening incentives for more 
environment-friendly forms of agricultural production. This shifts back the emphasis towards 
allocative aspects of agricultural policy. From the theoretical point of view it is not entirely   14
clear whether status-quo interests have a greater influence at the national or the European 
level. Whether or not these reforms could have been achieved in a regime of exclusively 
national responsibilities, remains an open question. 
A comparison of concentration ratios between the years 2000 and 2006 shows, that (1) 
the CAP reform 2003 has not improved the distribution of decoupled direct payments and (2) 
that there is no uniform pattern of change. The concentration ratio of EU-15 member states 
were 78 in both years. This is the result of two antagonistic developments: in some countries 
like France, Ireland, Austria the measure of inequality was lower in 2006 compared to 2000 
while the opposite was true in countries like The Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, and Italy. 
Given that the Single Farm Payment was introduced only recently it is too early to draw 
conclusions on the distributive effects of the historical versus the area based scheme. Given 
this observation it is evident that changing the rules on the allocation of direct payments as the 
Commission  suggested  in  the  'health  check'  process,  will  affect  the  distribution.  The 
interesting finding is that changes of the distribution within member states are happening 
'relatively'  easy  while  the  relative  ranking  of  concentration  between  member  states  is 
relatively stable. Only in a scenario of minimum payments of 500 € per holding and year the 
ranking of concentration between member states changes significantly. 
Admittedly, CAP payments, among them direct payments, are hardly motivated by 
distributive considerations alone. Currently they are justified to ease the process of integration 
for the agricultural community of Member States that have recently entered the EU. Another 
purpose  is  to  facilitate  structural  adjustment  of  farms  that  are  exposed  to  freer  market 
conditions after decades of CAP interventions. Moreover, as direct payments are only granted 
if standards of good agricultural and environmental condition ("cross compliance") are met, 
such payments have an environmental facet as well. The current debate about strengthened 
modulation  or  abandoning  the  historical  model  provides  possibilities  to  improve  the 
distribution of DP. At the same time, taking into account the principle of “fiscal equivalence” 
(Olson, 1969) could give guidance for the question which of the issues currently addressed by 
direct payments should be addressed at EU level or at the level of Member States. 
The theory of fiscal federalism takes a sceptical view towards any sector-specific EU 
responsibility,  including  agricultural  policy.  It  is  grounded  in  the  observation  that  the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), while historically geared towards allocative objectives, 
has over time become an instrument of income maintenance for agricultural producers. Yet, 
according to the principles of fiscal equivalence and of subsidiarity, member states should be 
responsible  for  inter-personal  income  redistribution.  Calls  for  a  re-nationalisation  of 
agricultural policy competences should nevertheless be treated with caution. 
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